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THE TWO-MURDER RULE IN ILLINOIS-A
POTENTIAL RETURN TO ARBITRARY IMPOSITION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY
Joel H. Swift*
For approximately the first one hundred and fifty years of its existence,
the state of Illinois resisted the grading of murder into culpability degrees
with separate penalties.' Thus, while intent to kill was one consideration
in determining whether malice aforethought was present, there existed no
separate crime of premeditated murder in the first degree. 2 Instead, all un-
justified homicides were murder if committed under facts and circumstances
deemed to constitute either express or implied malice aforethought.
During the sixteen years between 1961 and 1977, however, three distinct
but interrelated developments converged, resulting in the adoption of a
modified form of first degree premeditated murder, and making culpability
a potentially determining consideration in the imposition of the death penalty.
The first development was the adoption of section 9-1(a) of the Criminal
Code of 1961.1 This section, which removed the phrase "malice aforethought"
* Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. B.A., Wagner College; J.D.,
LL.M., University of Pennsylvania.
1. Murder was defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being . . .with malice
aforethought, either express or implied." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 358 (1959); see People
v. Heffernan, 312 I11. 66, 71, 143 N.E. 411, 413 (1924) (Illinois statute recognizes only one
crime of murder).
2. See People v. Bush, 414 Ill. 441, 111 N.E.2d 326 (1953); People v. Brown, 288 Ill.
489, 123 N.E. 515 (1919); People v. Curtright, 258 Ill. 430, 101 N.E. 551 (1910). Since an
intent to kill was not contained in the definition of murder, the crime was proven sufficiently
if there was a finding that an unlawful killing was performed with malice aforethought, either
express or implied. People v. Heffernan, 312 111. 66, 70, 143 N.E. 411, 413 (1924). Express
malice aforethought was defined as "the deliberate intention to take away the life of a fellow
creature." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 358 (1959). Malice aforethought, however, could be infer-
red where there was no "considerable provocation" or where the circumstances of the killing
demonstrated an "abandoned and malignant heart." Id.; see also People v. Slaughter, 29 I11.
2d 384, 389, 194 N.E.2d 193, 195-96 (1963) (it is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of malice
that a person acted with a wanton and reckless disregard of human life); People v. Winters,
29 I11. 2d 74, 80, 193 N.E.2d 809, 812-13 (1963) (malice can be inferred from the character
of the assault); People v. Henderson, 398 I11. 348, 354, 75 N.E.2d 847, 849 (1947) (intent to
kill is necessary to constitute express malice, but where no provocation exists, malice can be
inferred); People v. Marshall, 398 I11. 256, 263, 75 N.E.2d 310, 313 (1947) (malice is establish-
ed where one shoots at one individual and unintentionally hits another); Kyle v. People, 215
I11. 250, 252, 74 N.E. 146, 147 (1905) (malice is established where the defendant, without pro-
vocation, starts a fight with deceased for the purpose of killing him). Thus, intent was only
one consideration in determining whether malice was present. People v. Heffernan, 312 111.
66, 70, 143 N.E. 411, 413 (1924). For a discussion of the common law influences upon the
definition of malice in Illinois homicide law, see O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None": A
Solution to an Illinois Homicide Quandary, 32 DEPAUL L. REV. 107, 109.10 (1982).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (1961). The relevant portions of the definition of murder are:
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from the definition of murder and replaced it with descriptions of the con-
duct, mental state, and circumstances that would render an unjustified
homicide murder, effectively categorized the substantive crime of murder as
intentional and unintentional."
The second and third developments were directly related to the death
penalty. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court declared Illinois' death
penalty statute to be in violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause
of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution.' As a direct
result of this and subsequent Supreme Court death penalty decisions,6 the
third development occurred-the adoption of a death penalty statute by the
Illinois legislature in 1977, making commission of two intentional or
premeditated murders an aggravating factor pursuant to which capital punish-
ment could be imposed.7 Consequently, since 1977 the determination of
whether a previous conviction was for intentional murder has been relevant
to the imposition of the death penalty.
This article examines the steps by which this situation developed and reviews
the jurisprudence of murder under the 1961 Code, both prior to and after
1977. It concludes that the language of the statute, and the failure of the
judiciary to recognize that intentional murder must be identified separately
from other forms of murder, has resulted in a potential for arbitrary im-
position of the death penalty that renders unconstitutional the intentional
murder provision of the death penalty statute. Finally, the article proposes
two methods of rectifying the problem, either through the adoption of a
jury instruction that distinguishes between intentional and unintentional
murder, or through a revision in the statutory language of section 9-1(a)
that would more accurately describe those types of murder.
HOMICIDE LAW IN ILLINOIS
When the Illinois murder statute was revised in 1961, the drafting com-
mittee found itself unable, or unwilling, to make a clear recommendation
on the death penalty.' The General Assembly had refused to suspend the
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder
if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another,
or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm to that individual ...
Id. For purposes of this article, section 9(a)(l) will be referred to as intentional murder and
section 9(a)(2) will be referred to as unintentional murder. Additionally, a discussion of the
Illinois statutory provision for felony murder is beyond the scope of this article. See ILL. Rav.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(3) (1961).
4. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
5. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 800 (1972).
6. See infra notes 15-30 and accompanying text.
7. Act of June 21, 1977, Pub. Act. No. 80-26, § 1, 1977 111. Laws 70 (codified at ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (1981)).
8. ILL. AN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 Committee Comments-1961 at 17, 19-20 (Smith-Hurd
1979).
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death penalty two years earlier,9 and the committee proposal obviously
represented a compromise. The death penalty was retained as a potential
punishment for murder, but sentiment "that the death penalty should be
applied only to the most heinous types of murder"'" caused the committee
to define the substantive crime with regard to separate categories, distin-
guished by the perceived level of culpability. Thus, subsection (a)(1) of sec-
tion 9-1 described as the most culpable form of murder that "in which the
evidence clearly showed the purpose to kill the victim . . . or some other
person, the victim being killed accidentally." I The committee also indicated
its awareness that the courts had recognized "[tihe intent to do great bodily
harm . . . as equivalent to the intent to kill. '"'2 The second, less culpable,
class of murder defined in subsection (a)(2) was designed by the drafting
committee to identify those murders "in which actual intent to kill or do
great bodily harm was not proved, and perhaps was disclaimed by the defen-
dant, but the defendant's intentional act was clearly dangerous to life and
he acted regardless of the consequences."' 3 In drafting the statute, the com-
mittee therefore distinguished between intentional and unintentional murder
and left for a later date the decision of whether this distinction could be
considered as a factor in making sentencing determinations."
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN ILLINOIS IN LIGHT
OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
While the substantive definition of murder stood in this form, significant
events were occurring concerning the constitutional validity of the death
9. Id. § 1-7 Committee Comments-1961 at 34 (Smith-Hurd 1979). Nevertheless, the General
Assembly had recognized the significance of the issue by debating it separately from revisions
in the substantive law. Id.
10. Id. § 9-1 Committee Comments-1961 at 19 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
11. Id. § 9-1 Committee Comments-1961 at 15 (Smith-Hurd 1979). The comments of a
legislative drafting committee are "a source to which [courts] may properly look in determin-
ing legislative intent." People v. Touhy, 31 11. 2d 236, 239, 201 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1964); see
also People v. Petropolous, 59 I11. App. 2d 298, 306, 208 N.E.2d 323, 329 (1st Dist. 1965)
(citing People v. Touhy, 31 111. 2d 236, 201 N.E.2d 425 (1964)), aff'd, 34 Il. 2d 179, 214
N.E.2d 765 (1966).
12. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 Committee Comments-1961 at 15 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
The drafters of the 1961 Code indicated that intentional murder described those situations in
which "the evidence clearly showed [a] purpose to kill the victim . . . or some other per-
son .. " Id.
13. Id. at 15-16. The Committee specifically noted that subsection (a)(2)-the unintentional
murder provision-was "intended to define conduct which, lacking actual intent to kill or do
great bodily harm or knowledge that such a result will occur, involve[d] knowledge of the
probability that the offender's acts will cause death or great bodily harm." Id. at 18.
14. Id. at 19-20. The Committee noted:
In fact, one of the prime reasons for differentiating between the various types of
murder . . . was to permit a variation in penalty. However, such a wide divergence
of opinion developed as to the desirability of reducing the number of cases in which
the death penalty can be used that it appeared desirable . . . to leave [the issue]
to the General Assembly . . . as a separate proposition.
Id. at 19. The Committee also stated, "If the General Assembly, and the people of the State,
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penalty. In 1972, citing its decision in Furman v. Georgia,' the United States
Supreme Court held in Moore v. Illinois "that the imposition of the death
penalty under statutes such as those of Illinois is violative of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments" to the United States Constitution."' For several
years the meaning of this decision was unclear, primarily because the judg-
ment of the Court in Furman was announced in a per curiam opinion, with
each member of the majority writing a separate concurring opinion. Thus,
no single rationale for the decisions was established, leaving some doubt
as to whether a constitutionally valid death penalty statute could be drafted.' 7
Chief Justice Burger, however, in his analysis of the five concurring opin-
ions, concluded that for at least two members of the majority the constitu-
tional defect was the "random and unpredictable manner" in which the
punishment of death was being meted out." Consequently, he advised
legislative bodies that they might "bring their laws into compliance with the
Court's ruling by providing standards for juries and judges to follow in deter-
mining the sentence in capital cases or by more narrowly defining the crimes
for which the penalty is to be imposed." 9 Either of these approaches, the
Chief Justice suggested, would meet the objections to the Georgia and Illinois
statutes, made by Justices Stewart and White, and would thereby satisfy
a majority of the Court.
Four years later, in a series of three decisions, the Chief Justice's analysis
of Furman proved accurate. In Gregg v. Georgia0 and Proffitt v. Florida,2'
desire at any time to eliminate capital punishment in less than all cases the division of the
offense of murder into three categories . . .will permit it to be done." Id. at 19-20.
15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
16. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 800 (1972). Although the Illinois statute was formally
struck down in Moore, the rationale for that decision was stated in the five concurring opi-
nions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
17. See Comment, Illinois' Post-Furman Capital Punishment Statute, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 400.
18. 408 U.S. 238, 400 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger
analyzed the pivotal concurring opinions of Justices Stewart and White. Id. at 397-98. The
Chief Justice found that the critical factor in both of these concurring opinions was the infre-
quent imposition of the death penalty. Id. Chief Justice Burger did not read the concurrences
as proscribing death as a punishment per se but that Justices Stewart and White objected to
the unbridled discretion exercised by judges and juries in imposing a death sentence. Id.
An analysis of all five concurring opinions suggests that the common denominator of the
Furman majority was the potential for arbitrary or discriminatory infliction of death. Justice
Douglas stated that the statutes were unconstitutional because the sentence was being selective-
ly imposed upon minorities. 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Stewart concur-
red, stating that the eighth amendment prohibited a death penalty that was capriciously and
randomly imposed. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White stated that the infre-
quent imposition of the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 310
(White, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty was
a per se violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurr-
ing); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring). Moreover, Justice Brennan expressed the view that
the infrequency of imposing the death sentence nullified any possible penal purpose. Id. at
257 (Brennan, J., concurring).
19. 408 U.S. 238, 400 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting).
20. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
21. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
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the Court examined death penalty statutes that adopted the first of the Chief
Justice's suggestions-the provision of standards to be followed in deter-
mining the sentence. Noting that the statutes required proof of the existence
of one or more specified aggravating factors, and that a determination that
these factors outweighed any mitigating circumstances present, the two opin-
ions held that the deficiencies found in Furman v. Georgia had been
rectified.22 In the accompanying case of Jurek v. Texas,23 the second of Chief
Justice Burger's suggestions was at issue. In Jurek, the majority held that
although the Texas statute did not specify certain aggravating circumstances,
it did narrow the categories of murder for which the death penalty could
be imposed; consequently, the same result was achieved and the statute was
considered constitutionally valid.1
4
Implicit in the plurality opinion of Gregg were the seeds of a controversy
yet to develop-the relevance of culpability to the death penalty. The opin-
22. The opinion of the Gregg Court, announced by Justice Stewart, stated as follows:
The basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who were being con-
demned to death capriciously and arbitrarily. Under the procedures before the Court
in that case, sentencing authorities were not directed to give attention to the nature
or circumstances of the crime committed or to the character or record of the defen-
dant. Left unguided, juries imposed the death sentence in a way that could only
be called freakish. The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast, focus the
jury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized
characteristics of the individual defendant. While the jury is permitted to consider
any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one
statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death. In this way
the jury's discretion is channeled. No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly
impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.
In addition, the review function of the Supreme Court of Georgia. affords addi-
tional assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision in Furman are not
present to any significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07. In a concurring opinion, Justice White expressed a
similar view of the Georgia statute. Id. at 207, 222-23 (White, J., concurring). The Florida
statute was given like consideration in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258; id. at 260 (White,
J., concurring). A seventh member of the Court, Justice Blackmun, concurred in the judgments
in both Gregg and Proffitt. His conclusion was based not on the view that the deficiencies
found in Furman had been corrected, however, but on a continued assertion that Furman had
been wrongly decided. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 227; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at
261 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
23. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
24. The Jurek Court declared:
We conclude that Texas' capital-sentencing procedures, like those of Georgia and
Florida, do not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. By narrowing its
definition of capital murder, Texas has essentially said that there must be at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance in a first-degree murder case before a death
sentence may even be considered. By authorizing the defense to bring before the
jury at the separate sentencing hearing whatever mitigating circumstances relating
to the individual defendant can be adduced, Texas has ensured that the sentencing
jury will have adequate guidance to enable it to perform its sentencing function.
By providing prompt judicial review of the jury's decision in a court with statewide
jurisdiction, Texas has provided a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and
consistent imposition of death sentences under law. Because this system serves to
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ion pointed out that "[tihe death penalty is said to serve two principal social
purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective
offenders." 25 With regard to the former, capital punishment was viewed as
"an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct" 2'
and possibly "the appropriate sanction in extreme cases . . . [which are]
grievous . . . affront[s] to humanity .... *"27 With regard to the latter social
purpose, the plurality opinion indicated that although the threat of death
probably has little or no effect on the murderer who acts in passion," in
the case of "carefully contemplated murders . . . the possible penalty of
death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to
act." 2 9 The Justices casting the pivotal votes upholding the facial validity
of the death penalty apparently based their decisions on the same
philosophical perception as that which motivated the drafters of the Illinois
murder statute-the death penalty can be justified more readily in the con-
text of intent-to-kill murders because they require greater culpability than
murders in which causing death is not the "conscious objective or purpose"
of the killer.30
The issue of the relevance of culpability as a basis for differentiating be-
tween capital and noncapital murder arose more clearly two years later in
the Supreme Court decision of Lockett v. Ohio,3' in which the death penalty
statute limited the sentencing court to a consideration of three specified
mitigating factors.32 Chief Justice Burger, in a plurality opinion joined by
assure that sentences of death will not be "wantonly" or "freakishly" imposed,
it does not violate the Constitution.
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276. A similar view was embraced by Justices White and Blackmun.
Id. at 277 (White, J., concurring); id. at 279 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
25. 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). For a discussion of the deterrent effects of death penalty
statutes, see Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65 AM. EcoN. REV. 397, 415-16 (1975) (strong probability that executions have a deter-
rent effect). But see Carrington, Deterrence, Death, and the Victims of Crime: A Common
Sense Approach, 35 VAND. L. REV. 587 (1982) (no way to determine deterrent effect, but death
penalty should still be imposed); cf. Comment, Constitutional Law: The Death Penalty: A
Critique of the Philosophical Bases Held to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment Requirements for
Its Justification, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 567 (1981) (moral and philosophical resolutions would never
allow imposition of the death penalty).
26. 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
27. Id. at 184.
28. Id. at 185.
29. Id. at 186.
30. The statutory definition of intent provides the following:
A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or
engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious
objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-4 (1981).
31. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
32. Id. at 607. The mitigating factors Ohio juries were allowed to consider were whether
the victim caused or encouraged the crime; whether the defendant acted under duress; and
whether the defendant committed the crime while suffering from a psychosis that was insuffi-
cient to establish an insanity defense. Id. (citing OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (1975)).
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Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, held that the state could not constitu-
tionally prohibit the consideration of any relevant mitigating circumstances
and suggested that "[tihe absence of direct proof that the defendant intend-
ed to cause the death of the victim" was improperly precluded from
consideration.33 It is thus clear that the plurality viewed a defendant's intent
to kill as a relevant factor in capital sentencing. Justice White's concurring
opinion went even further, asserting that "it violates the Eighth Amend-
ment to impose the penalty of death without a finding that the defendant
possessed a purpose to cause the death of the victim." 34 Justices Blackmun
and Marshall also expressed the view that a death penalty statute which did
not include a consideration of culpability was, for that reason, constitutionally
invalid."
The relevance of culpability to the death penalty arose again in Enmund
v. Florida,3" in which Justice White, writing for a five member majority,
held that such punishment could not be imposed when the evidence indicated
that the defendant neither killed, attempted to kill, nor intended to kill the
victim." In reaching this conclusion, the Court pointed out that the deci-
sion as to capital punishment must focus on the defendant's culpability, and
stated that "[ilt is fundamental that 'causing harm intentionally must be
punished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.' ""
Noting the social purposes served by the death penalty, as identified in Gregg
v. Georgia,39 the Court indicated that it was "quite unconvinced" that
unintended murders would be measurably deterred by the threat of the death
penalty,"0 and that retribution "very much depends on the degree of . . .
culpability."" Although Justice O'Connor, in dissent, characterized Enmund's
argument (and therefore the majority's holding) as asserting that "death is
an unconstitutional penalty absent an intent to kill,"4 2 such a broad reading
of the opinion may be unwarranted. 3 The decisions in Lockett and Enmund
33. Id. at 608.
34. Id. at 624 (White, J., concurring).
35. Justice Blackmun declared that in his view, "the Ohio judgment in this case improperly
provided the death sentence for a defendant . . . without permitting any consideration by the
sentencing authority of . . . the degree of her mens rea, in the commission of the homicide."
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 587, 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Marshall maintained
that the Ohio death penalty statute "makes no distinction between a willful and malicious
murderer and an accomplice to an armed robbery in which a killing unintentionally occurs.
[It] turns on fortuitous events that do not distinguish the intention or moral culpability
of the defendants." Id. at 620 (Marshall, J., concurring).
36. 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
37. Id. at 3376-77.
38. Id. at 3377 (quoting H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 162 (1968)).
39. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
40. Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
41. Id. at 3378.
42. Id. at 3388.
43. Since Enmund was not physically present at the time the homicide occurred but was
waiting in the escape vehicle, the Court clearly was not presented with the issue of whether
the death penalty may be imposed upon a murderer who actually, but unintentionally, kills
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do establish with certainty, however, that a culpability line drawn between
intentional and unintentional murder, for purposes of capital punishment,
if not constitutionally mandated, is unquestionably constitutionally permitted.
While the Supreme Court was debating issues of arbitrariness and culp-
ability with respect to the death penalty, the Illinois legislature also was grap-
pling with these problems. In the wake of Moore v. Illinois," which struck
down Illinois' death penalty statute, the state legislature adopted a new
statutory provision in November of 1973. This provision contained a list
of six circumstances which, if present, would justify the imposition of the
death penalty, provided that specified procedures were followed." Follow-
ing the Texas approach, all but one of the circumstances defined a particular
fact situation in which capital punishmeni would be appropriate.4 6 One cir-
cumstance, however, characterized as the "two-murder" aggravating factor,
provided that the death penalty might be imposed when the defendant
has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals under Section
9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, or under any law of the
United States or of any State which is substantially identical to Subsection
(a) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, regardless
of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several
related or unrelated acts. .... 41
Significantly, no distinction was drawn among the several categories of murder
established in subsection (a) of section 9-1, and the two-murder rule therefore
authorized execution of any individual twice convicted of murder, without
regard to whether the murders were intentional or unintentional.
This 1973 version of the death penalty statute was challenged before the
Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham,"8 where the
defendant's primary claim was the invalidity of the procedures established
for imposition of capital punishment. Included, however, was a challenge
the victim. This issue also is not raised by the Illinois provision under consideration here, which
at least since 1977 has limited imposition of the death penalty to individuals who personally
have committed two intentional murders. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b)(3); see infra notes
53-54 and accompanying text.
44. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
45. Act of Nov. 8, 1973, Pub. Act. No. 78-921, § 2, 1973 II1. Laws 2959, 2961 (amending
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3 (1973)).
46. The circumstances in which the state could have sought the death penalty were (1) the
murder of a policeman or fireman in the line of duty; (2) the murder of a correctional officer
in the line of duty or otherwise present at the facility; (3) the commission of a multiple murder;
(4) a murder committed during the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus, or other public
conveyance; (5) a murder committed by a hired killer; and (6) a murder that occurred in the
course of a robbery, rape, aggravated kidnapping, arson, or following the commission of inde-
cent liberties with a child. Id.
In addition, the trial judge was to notify the chief judge of the circuit court before sentenc-
ing the defendant to death. The chief judge then assigned three judges to hear evidence and
determine the sentence. The trial judge then entered the sentence as determined by this panel. Id.
47. Id.
48. 61 IlI. 2d 353, 336 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
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to the statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances. Although the statute
was declared unconstitutional based on the procedural issues, the court
specifically upheld the validity of the aggravating circumstances, stating:
Respondents have raised constitutional claims that several of the enumerated
situations which require imposition of the death penalty are vague and
uncertain. We have examined the categories enumerated in the statute and
are of the opinion that they are proper.4 9
Notwithstanding this determination, the invalid portions of the statute were
found to be so connected to, and dependent on, the valid portions that they
could not be severed; therefore, the entire statute was declared unconstitu-
tional. 0
Subsequent to this decision, the United States Supreme Court decisions
in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek" were handed down. During its next attempt
to draft a death penalty statute, the Illinois legislature was afforded the
guidance provided by those opinions, as well as the holding in Cunningham.
In the 1977 version of the statute, currently in effect, a list of seven ag-
gravating factors was established," including a revised version of the two-
murder rule. This version provides:
A defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has at-
tained the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of murder
may be sentenced to death if:
3. the defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals
under subsection (a) of this Section or under any law of the United States
or of any state which is substantially similar to Subsection (a) of this Sec-
tion regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same
act or of several related or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the
result of either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate
premeditated acts. .... .1
The addition of the italicized words is clearly a major change in the two-
murder rule. This change indicates that under subsection (a) of section 9-1
the mere fact of two murder convictions is insufficient to justify the imposi-
tion of the death penalty. Under the current language, both murders must
49. Id. at 361, 336 N.E.2d at 6.
50. Id. at 362, 336 N.E.2d at 7.
51. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
52. ILL. RE. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b)(1)-(7) (1981). Some of the aggravating circumstances
are the following: the murder of a policeman or fireman in the course of his duties; the murder
of a correctional department employee; murder committed during the hijacking of an airplane,
train, ship, or bus; murder committed for hire; felony murder; and murder of a witness for
the prosecution. Id.
Recently, the legislature added an eighth aggravating circumstance, which provides that a
defendant who murders an individual under the age of 12 in an exceptionally brutal, heinous,
or wantonly cruel manner may be sentenced to death. Act of Dec. 15, 1982, Pub. Act. No.
82-1025, § 1, 1982 Ill. Laws 2927, 2929.
53. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-(b)(3) (1981) (emphasis added).
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have been committed intentionally." Thus, fifteen years after the drafters
of subsection (a) drew the distinction between intended and unintended
murder, for the purpose of limiting the death penalty to the more culpable
form," the legislature adopted the suggested distinction, making conviction
of more than one intentional murder an aggravating factor that justifies im-
position of the death penalty, while excluding the lower culpability categories
of murder from the two-murder rule.
In light of United States Supreme Court case law, the two-murder rule
is clearly valid. The plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia pointed out that
the death penalty serves "two principal social purposes: retribution and deter-
rence .. ."I' A two-murder rule is well designed to achieve these goals.
To the extent that retribution is a motivating consideration, it is surely
reasonable for a legislature to conclude that someone who murders twice
is more deserving of society's vengeance than someone who murders once.
Inherent in such a judgment is the view that one who kills once (under cir-
cumstances that did not include any other aggravating factor) is deserving
of severe punishment but has not yet earned the most extreme "expression
of society's moral outrage."" On the other hand, once he has received
society's mercy and has been afforded another chance, the commission of
a second murder can reasonably be deemed sufficiently "grevious an affront
to humanity" 8 to warrant extreme retributive punishment.
It also can be logically asserted that the deterrent function is reasonably
served by a two-murder rule. If the death penalty has any deterrent effect
at all," that effect has to be substantially increased when it is no longer
a generalized threat but has been focused on a particular individual and has
specifically placed him on notice that he risks his own life if he repeats his
criminal conduct.
Similarly, limitation of the two-murder rule to intentional murders is a
reasonable legislative judgment, effecting the social purposes of retribution
and deterrence. As the decisions in Lockett v. Ohio"0 and Enmund v Florida6'
pointed out, the more culpable the homicidal conduct, the stronger is the
societal sense of a need for vengeance. At the same time, while the prospect
of being subjected to execution may have some deterrent effect on the
carelessly dangerous person, it is not unreasonable for a legislature to con-
54. The Illinois Senate debates indicated that the two-murder rule should be applicable only
to intentional murders. S. DEB., 80th Sess., 65th Legis.. Day (June 1, 1977) (available on
microfiche at 19-21). It was suggested that where a person kills one person intentionally and
kills another accidentally, the two-murder rule would be inapplicable. Id.
A similar view was taken in the House. H. DEa., 80th Sess., 76th Legis. Day (June 14,
1977) (available on microfiche at 91).
55. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
56. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 184.
59. Id. at 184 n.31.
60. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
61. 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
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clude that the primary deterrent value of the death penalty lies in the con-
text of consciously formulated decisions to take life.6"
All of this appears to dovetail quite well. The Illinois murder statute
distinguishes between intentional murder and unintentional murder in subsec-
tions (a)(1) and (a)(2) of section 9-1. 63 The death penalty statute adopts this
distinction, in subsection (b)(3) of section 9-1,64 as a relevant factor in deter-
mining whether a sentence of death may be imposed. And the United States
Supreme Court has held that such a distinction is clearly valid, if not
mandated. 65 The facial validity of the rule that makes the commission of
two intentional murders an aggravating factor warranting imposition of the
death penalty, therefore, cannot be seriously questioned.
POTENTIAL FOR INAPPROPRIATE APPLICATION OF THE Two-MURDER RULE
The operation of the two-murder rule is obviously dependent upon pro-
per application of the substantive distinction between intentional murder
defined in subsection (a)(1) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code and uninten-
tional murder defined in (a)(2). In practice, however, this distinction has
not been maintained, and the line between the two categories has been
effectively destroyed by judicial interpretation and jury application because,
notwithstanding the existence of two categories, the statute created only a
single crime of murder that could be committed with varying degrees of
culpability." Because of the absence of a penalty distinction prior to 1977,
there was little reason for courts or juries to be cognizant of the intended
categorical differentiations.
This problem has been exacerbated by a potential overlap between inten-
tional and unintentional murder caused by the operation of' an evidentiary
inference and by the specific language of subsection (a)(2). The evidentiary
inference, which has been part of Illinois murder law for over a century,
permits a trier of fact to conclude that a person intends the natural and
probable consequences of his deliberate acts. 67 Thus, one who deliberately
62. See Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3377-78 (1982) (quoting Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946), for the proposition that "capital
punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and
deliberation").
63. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 25-43 and 57-59 and accompanying text.
66. "Under section 9-1 there is but one crime of murder, not three separate and distinct
offenses. . . . Each of subparagraphs (1), (2) and (3) under section 9-1(a) describes the mental
state or the conduct of the defendant which must accompany the acts which cause the death."
People v. Allen, 56 Ill. 2d 536, 543, 309 N.E.2d 544, 547 (1974).
67. See People v. Davis, 35 I1. 2d 55, 61, 219 N.E.2d 468, 471 (1966) ("intent is implied
from the character of the act"). This evidentiary inference is sometimes wrongly described in
criminal cases as a presumption. See People v. Coolidge, 26 Ill. 2d 533, 187 N.E.2d 694 (1963).
In discussing this inference, the court in Coolidge stated:
[S]ince every sane man is presumed to intend all the natural probable consequences
flowing from his own deliberate act, it follows that if one wilfully does an act
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engages in conduct that creates a strong probability of death or serious bodily
harm, from which death results, may be found guilty of intentional murder
without direct proof of an intent to kill. So long as there existed a high
degree of probability that a death would occur, intent to kill could be
inferred.
Conversely, the language chosen to describe unintentional murder under
subsection (a)(2)-knowledge that the conduct creates a strong probability
of death or great bodily harm-lends itself to a misreading that would in-
clude intentional as well as unintentional murders. An attorney conversant
with the definitional difference in the mental states established by Article
4 of the Code should be aware that intentional murder exists when causing
death is the actor's "conscious objective or purpose," ' 61 while knowing murder
occurs when the actor is conciously aware of a risk that death will result,
but he disregards this risk.61 To a lay juror, charged in the language of
the direct and natural tendency of which is to destroy another's life, the natural
irresistible conclusion, in the absence of qualifying facts, is that the destruction
of such other person's life was intended.
Id. at 537, 187 N.E.2d at 697 (emphasis added). The distinction between inferences and presump-
tions in criminal proceedings has important constitutional ramifications. Inferences permit a
jury to find the existence of one fact upon direct proof of another fact. See E. CLEARY &
M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 304.1, at 86-88 (3d ed. 1979 & Supp. 1983).
Presumptions, on the other hand, require the trier of fact to find the existence of the fact
based upon proof of another fact. Id. This mandatory nature of presumptions precludes their
use in criminal proceedings because it relieves the prosecution of its burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979) (instruction that the law presumes a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts may be interpreted as mandatory and, therefore, violates the fourteenth amend-
ment's requirement that the state prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (rebuttable presumption that places the burden on
defendant of providing some evidence that he acted in a heat of passion unconstitutionally
relieves the prosecution of its burden of proof); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the state to prove every element of a criminal
charge beyond a reasonable doubt); see also People v. Weinstein, 35 Ill. 2d 467, 470, 220
N.E.2d 432, 433-34 (1966) (pre-Winship case holding that Illinois Constitution requires the pros-
ecution to prove every element of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt). Inferences,
however, because of their permissive nature, can be used in criminal proceedings. See, e.g.,
People v. Evans, 92 II1. App. 3d 874, 416 N.E.2d 377 (2d Dist. 1981) (for a conviction of
murder, it is sufficient to infer intent by showing the commission of an act the natural ten-
dency of which is to destroy another's life). For a more detailed discussion of inferences and
presumptions as applied in civil and criminal cases, see Graham, Presumptions-More Than
You Ever Wanted to Know and Yet Were Too Disinterested to Ask, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 431
(1981).
68. See supra note 30.
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-5 (1981) provides:
Knowledge; A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:
(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his conduct, described by the statute
defining the offense, when he is consciously aware that his conduct is of such nature
or that such circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness
of the substantial probability that such fact exists.
(b) The result of his conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when
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the murder statute, one who points a loaded firearm directly at another and
deliberately pulls the trigger70 obviously knows that his acts create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm. Consequently, a jury presented
with such a case and unaware that its decision could have capital punish-
ment implications, might randomly choose subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) as the
provision violated, without regard to, or even a realization of, the culpability
difference.
The contours of this problem are best evidenced by several illustrations.
In one of the earliest cases to arise under the 1961 Code, People v. Davis,"
the defendant, her boyfriend, and two other persons had been playing cards
in the defendant's kitchen. At one point during the evening, the defendant
pointed a gun at the boyfriend, who was seated with his hands on the table.
The testimony of the other witnesses indicated that she brandished the gun
angrily and demanded two dollars from the victim and that both witnesses
attempted to persuade her to put the gun away. The defendant ignored these
protests and fired two shots, one of which entered the victim's neck, causing
death. The jury was instructed on (a)(2) murder, voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter, and self-defense, and it returned a verdict of guilty of (a)(2)
murder. In affirming the conviction the supreme court stated, "The evidence
in this case would have justified an instruction based upon the theory that
the defendant deliberately intended to kill .... The record does not indicate
why the prosecution failed to submit such an instruction." 7 The court then
held that intent to kill need not be proven but could be inferred where death
was a natural and probable consequence of the conduct.73 In other words,
the supreme court affirmed a conviction of unintended murder, upon facts
that clearly demonstrated that the defendant had an intent to kill, based
upon the principle that intent could be inferred from the dangerous con-
duct. In this posture, should Davis kill again, it would be next to impossible
to determine whether her first murder would be considered intentional, and
thus an aggravating circumstance, for purposes of the application to the two-
murder rule, although clearly the rule should apply.7"
he is consciously aware that such result is practically certain to be caused by his
conduct.
Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully, within
the meaning of a statute using the latter term, unless the statute clearly requires
another meaning.
70. See People v. Bone, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 432 N.E.2d 329 (3d Dist. 1982); People
v. Stocks, 93 111. App. 3d 439, 417 N.E.2d 1080 (5th Dist. 1981).
71. 35 I11. 2d 55, 219 N.E.2d 468 (1966).
72. Id. at 60-61, 219 N.E.2d at 471.
73. See id. at 61, 219 N.E.2d at 471.
74. The statement that this murder should count is intended only to suggest that it is the
type of murder that the legislature undoubtedly had in mind when it adopted both the inten-
tional murder provision of section 9-1(a)(l) and the two intentional murder aggravating factor
of section 9-1(b)(3). No opinion is herein expressed as to the legislative intent or constitutional
validity of a retroactive application of section 9-1(b)(3).
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Three additional cases from the early 1970's serve to further illustrate the
breakdown of the distinction between intentional and unintentional murder.
In People v. Forrest,75 the defendant, with the expressed intention to kill
the occupant of a passing car, shot and killed his own companion. Not-
withstanding the clear language of subsection (a)(1) indicating that inten-
tional murder results if "[a] person . . . kills an individual ... [with intent]
to kill ...that individual or another,"6 the appellate court held that For-
rest's conduct was sufficient to constitute (a)(2) unintentional murder. In
the similar case of People v. French,77 the defendant fired a gun at a crowd
of people, killing one. Again, the court concluded that the evidence satisfied
(a)(2) murder but applied the Davis reasoning that intent to kill could be
inferred from the high degree of likelihood that death would result from
the conduct. Finally, in People v. Wilson," the defendant and his victim
had had several quarrels; shortly after one quarrel, the defendant approached
his victim, said "you know, I'm for real," and plunged a knife into the
victim's chest.79 In this case, the appellate court did not infer intent but
held that there was a strong probability that his acts would cause death or
serious bodily harm.
As has been indicated, the absence of a penalty distinction prior to 1977
reasonably explains the judicial failure to insure that juries understood, and
properly applied, the difference between intentional and unintentional
murder.8" Since the adoption of intent to kill as an element of murder that
has relevance to capital punishment, however, it has become necessary that
the culpability distinction be made along with each murder conviction. In
other words, when eligibility for, or exemption from, execution is determin-
ed by the mental state with which the crime was committed, the eighth amend-
ment is not satisfied unless the jury specifically determines whether that men-
tal state existed. An examination of post-1977 murder convictions, however,
indicates that the kind of random categorization condemned in Furman v.
Georgia8 is currently in operation in Illinois.
In what is undoubtedly the smallest category of cases, the crimes appear
to have been properly characterized. In People v. Vega,82 for example, the
defendant terminated a long running fued by shooting the victim five times.
The jury concluded that Vega intended to cause death or great bodily harm
and convicted him of murder under subsection (a)(1). As a consequence,
the retributive and deterrent purposes of the two-murder rule have been set
in operation and Vega has been placed on notice that a repetition of this
method of solving a problem could cost him his own life.8"
75. 133 II1. App. 2d 70, 272 N.E.2d 813 (lst Dist. 1971).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(1) (1981) (emphasis added).
77. 3 Ill. App. 3d 884, 279 N.E.2d 519 (lst Dist. 1972).
78. 3 111. App. 3d 481, 278 N.E.2d 473 (lst Dist. 1971).
79. Id. at 484, 278 N.E.2d 475.
80. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
81. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
82. 107 111. App. 3d 289, 437 N.E.2d 919 (2d Dist. 1982).
83. An examination of reported appellate reviews of murder convictions since 1977 discloses
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Vega's culpability, however, is clearly no greater than that of a number
of other murderers who have not received such notice, and are not in danger
-of execution, either because the jury was not made aware of the inten-
tional/unintentional distinction between (a)(1) and (a)(2) murder, or because
it was not made aware of the necessity to determine the category into which
the murder fit. Illustrative of the first group of cases is People v. Bone,"
in which the court described the events as follows: "[T]he defendant ap-
proached [the victim], who asked 'May I help you?' The defendant replied
'Yes' and then shot [the victim] with a handgun. The defendant had both
hands on his gun and his legs were spread as the gun discharged." ' , This
killing was found to be unintentional murder under subsection (a)(2). Again,
in People v. Henry, 6 the court examined the evidence and concluded, "The
effect of this evidence supports the State's theory that the defendant
deliberately took aim at the victim before firing the fatal shot." 87 Nonetheless,
Henry's conviction for unintentional murder under subsection (a)(2) was sus-
tained, the court stating, "A review of the State's evidence clearly supports
a reasonable inference that the defendant's act was performed with the
knowledge that such act created a strong probability of death or great bodi-
ly harm to the victim." 88 Finally, in People v. Dunnigan," the accused threw
his victim to the ground, got on top of her, and repeatedly stabbed her
with a butcher knife, leaving the knife buried in her chest. The jury was
instructed only on unintentional murder, and its verdict of guilty was af-
firmed, the court stating that the defendant "must have known that his acts
created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm." 9 Paradoxical-
ly, in the preceding paragraph the court stated, "[T]he presence of multiple
stab wounds are themselves enough to negate any possibility that the defen-
dant acted . . . unintentionally." 9'
two other cases in which a verdict of intentional murder was returned. People v. Freeman,
105 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 435 N.E.2d 503 (4th Dist. 1982); People v. Manley, 104 Ill. App. 3d
478, 432 N.E.2d 1103 (1st Dist. 1982). In the Freeman case, the defendant was 16 years old
and thus not subject to the death penalty. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (1981). The
conviction in the Manley case was reversed for failure to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter and self-defense. Consequently, since the amendment of the death penalty provi-
sions in 1977, establishing intent to kill as a relevant consideration in the execution decision,
only one murderer, Vega, has been clearly placed in that category.
84. 103 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 432 N.E.2d 329 (3d Dist. 1982).
85. Id. at 1067, 432 N.E.2d at 330-31.
86. 103 I1. App. 3d 1143, 432 N.E.2d 359 (3d Dist. 1982).
87. Id. at 1148, 432 N.E.2d at 362.
88. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-(a)(2)).
89. 89 I11. App. 3d 763, 412 N.E.2d 37 (3d Dist. 1980).
90. Id. at 766, 412 N.E.2d at 39 (citing ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 94(a)(2)).
91. Id. In the following additional cases, a conviction of murder was sustained on the ground
that the victim knew his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm: Peo-
ple v. Battles, 93 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 418 N.E.2d 22 (1st Dist. 1981) (defendant had beaten
and starved his infant daughters over a period of four or five days); People v. Stocks, 93
111. App. 3d 439, 417 N.E.2d 1080 (5th Dist. 1981) (defendant, after telling another that he
was going to shoot the deceased, waited in the deceased's living room with a loaded shotgun
and shot him in the face). Probably the most egregious illustration of judicial failure to recognize
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The other category of cases is that in which there is merely a conviction
of murder, without a determination of whether it was intentional or uninten-
tional. Illustrative of these are People v. Gangstad,92 in which the defendant
and another person beat, strangled, and hanged their victim, and People
v. Reyes," in which the defendant, for no apparent reason, shot his victim
from a distance of five feet."' In each of these cases, a verdict finding the
defendant guilty of murder was returned, but no judgment was made regar-
ding the defendant's mental state, thus precluding subsequent application
of the two-murder rule should he kill again. A review of Vega, Bone, Henry,
Dunnigan, Gangstad, and Reyes, therefore, discloses two things. First, all
six defendants committed murder under circumstances which demonstrated
that causing death or great bodily harm was their conscious objective or
purpose, and thus should be in that group of murderers who may be sub-
ject to the death penalty in the event of a subsequent intentional murder
pursuant to section 9-1(b)(3). Second, only Vega is in fact in that group.
Consequently, the Illinois two-murder scheme, while clearly valid on its face,
is being applied in a manner that contains the very defect found to invalidate
death penalty statutes in Furman v. Georgia" and Moore v. Illinois.6 The
distinction between those murderers who may be executed and those who
may not is drawn purely arbitrarily, and the potential for imposing the death
penalty on "a capriciously selected random handful" 7 is present.
RESOLUTION
A resolution of this problem may be achieved in one of two ways. Because
the statutory scheme is facially valid, the failure to distinguish between in-
tentional and unintentional murder in practice can be judicially rectified
through the use of a jury instruction that will alert the jury both to the
need to differentiate between the categories and to the substantive difference
in the applicable mental state. Alternatively, the legislature could rectify the
the distinction between intentional murder and strong probability murder occurred in People
v. Beverly, 63 Il. App. 3d 186, 379 N.E.2d 753 (Ist Dist. 1978), where the victim was found
lying face down with his hands behind his head, shot in the back of the neck. Although the
particular type of murder was not specifically at issue in this case, the court suggested that
these facts would support a finding of subsection (a)(2) unintentional murder. Id. at 194, 379
N.E.2d at 760.
92. 105 Il. App. 3d 774, 434 N.E.2d 841 (2d Dist. 1982).
93. 108 I1. App. 3d 911, 439 N.E.2d 1089 (1st Dist. 1982).
94. See also People v. Hernandez, 105 Ill. App. 3d 501, 434 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1982)
(although defendant was indicted for both intentional and unintentional murder, and the ap-
pellate court described the crime as "obviously preconceived, cold-blooded action," the jury's
verdict failed to specify the category into which the murder fell); People v. Sanchez, 105 Ill.
App. 3d 488, 434 N.E.2d 395 (1st Dist. 1982) (although defendant was indicted for both inten-
tional and unintentional murder, verdict of guilty after bench trial failed to specify the category
into which the murder fell).
95. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
96. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
97. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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problems in the application of the statutory scheme by modifying the statutory
language for unintentional murder.
In drafting a new jury instruction, the judiciary should focus on two con-
siderations. First, such an instruction should clearly indicate that subsections
(a)(1) and (a)(2) define distinctly different categories of murder, and should
go beyond the mere use of the words intends and knows to include the defin-
ing language for those terms provided in sections 4-49s and 4-599 of the Code.
Furthermore, since intentional murder requires a higher level of culpability
than unintentional murder,' 0 any fact situation that could reasonably sup-
port a finding of either should include an indication that unintentional murder
should be considered only if intentional murder has not been proven.'0
With these considerations in mind, an appropriate jury instruction might
read as follows:
Murder may be committed either intentionally or unintentionally. A per-
son commits the offense of murder intentionally when he kills an individual
if, in performing the acts which cause the death, he intends to kill or
do great bodily harm to that individual or another. A person commits
the offense of murder unintentionally when he kills an individual if, in
performing the acts which cause the death, he knows that such acts create
a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or
another.
To sustain a charge of intentional murder, the State must prove the
following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death
of [the victim]; and
Second: That when the defendant did so, it was his conscious objective
or purpose to kill or do great bodily harm to [the victim] or another.
To sustain a charge of unintentional murder, the State must prove the
following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death
of [the victim]; and
Second: That the defendant, when he performed those acts, was either
indifferent as to whether he would cause the death of [the victim] or actively
desired that death not occur; and
That when the defendant did so he was consciously aware that his acts
created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to [the victim]
or another.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence thai intentional
murder has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the
defendant guilty of unintentional murder.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that intentional
murder has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that uninten-
98. See supra note 30.
99. See supra note 69.
100. See Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982); People v. Bone, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1066,
432 N.E.2d 329 (3d Dist. 1982).
101. Where the facts could justify conviction of crimes of different levels of culpability,
the lower culpability offense is an "included" offense. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-9(a) (1981).
Conviction of the included offense is appropriate only after an acquittal of the more culpable
crime. See People v. Bone, 103 Il. App. 3d 1066, 432 N.E.2d 329 (3d Dist. 1982).
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tional murder has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should
find the defendant guilty of unintentional murder.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that neither in-
tentional nor unintentional murder has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty of murder.
This proposed instruction opens with definitions of the two categories of
murder, in the words of the statute, but alerts the jury in the first paragraph
that two generically different mental states exist and that it will be expected
to determine whether actual intent was present. The second and third
paragraphs contain issue instructions that define the words intends and knows,
thereby assisting the jury in making its determination by distinguishing be-
tween defendants who have a conscious objective or purpose to kill and defen-
dants who do not actually intend to kill, but are subjectively aware that
they are engaging in extremely dangerous conduct. The final three paragraphs
direct the jury's attention to the order in which it should consider the issues
presented. Since intentional murder requires the highest level of culpability,
and may have capital punishment implications, the initial judgment should
be whether that class of murder has been committed. Only if the jury con-
cludes that death or great bodily harm was not actually intended, should
it move to the second class of murder and determine whether the accused
knowingly engaged in such extremely dangerous conduct that the resulting
death constitutes murder. Finally, the instruction informs the jury that if
neither of these situations has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, there
has been no murder.' 0 2
While this proposed jury instruction will achieve the goal of insuring an
independent evaluation of the actor's mental state when he committed the
homicide, and thereby lessen the potential for capricious inclusion or exclu-
sion of a particular murder from the death penalty category, its language
is considerably more complex than the language of the statute," 3 and it is
axiomatic that the more complex a jury instruction, the more likely it is
that the jury will misunderstand and misapply the law. An alternative method
of communicating the intentional/unintentional distinction to the jury, in
less complex form, would therefore be preferable, and is available through
a revision of the statutory language.
The precedential origins of the category of unintended murder that subsec-
tion (a)(2) was designed to describe trace back to the 1883 supreme court
decision in Mayes v. People. 0 In that case, the defendant threw a heavy
102. In drafting this proposed jury charge, the author took guidance from Illinois Supreme
Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, Illinois Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions, 7.01 and 7.02 (1981), and he wishes to express his gratitude to the Illinois Supreme
Court Committee.
103. One of the goals of the drafters of the current murder statute, and particularly subsec-
tion (a)(2), was to define the crime in language that would "require a minimum of further
definition in jury instructions. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1, Committee Comments-1961
at 18 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
104. 106 111. 306 (1883).
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glass at his wife, who was carrying a lighted oil lamp. The glass struck the
lamp, causing burning oil to spill over the wife, resulting in her death. In
affirming the murder conviction, notwithstanding the defendant's assertion
that there was insufficient proof of an intent to kill or cause great bodily
harm, the court stated:
[lit was utterly immaterial whether plaintiff in error intended the glass
should strike his wife ... or whether he had any specific intent, but acted
solely from general malicious recklessness, disregarding any and all conse-
quences. It is sufficient that he manifested a-reckless, murderous disposi-
tion. . . . [Ilt is apparent he was willing that any result might be pro-
duced, at whatever the harm to others. '
Mayes thus established reckless conduct, committed under circumstances
which created an unusually high risk of death or serious injury, which took
a human life, as a separate and distinct category of murder.'" During the
eight decades between the decision in Mayes and the adoption of the 1961
Code, Illinois courts repeatedly recognized this class of "reckless and wanton"
murder,"0 7 and it was the intention of the drafters of the Code to define
105. Id. at 313-14 (emphasis added).
106. A maliciously reckless murder requires a mental state similar to that required for the
crime of involuntary manslaughter. The difference between reckless murder and involuntary
manslaughter is in the degree of risk that an accused has disregarded. Cf. ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, § 9-3 (1981) (involuntary manslaughter statute); see Phegley v. Greer, 497 F. Supp.
519 (C.D. I11. 1980). The Greer court noted that "in Illinois, the crimes of murder and in-
voluntary manslaughter do not require proof of different mental states. The only distinction
between the crimes is the degree to which a defendant's acts risk death or great bodily harm."
Id. at 520. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(2) (1981) (murder is committed when
one's conduct creates a "strong probability of death") (emphasis added) with ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 9-3 (1981) (involuntary manslaughter is committed when one's conduct is "likely
to cause death") (emphasis added). For cases illustrating the differences between these two
mental states, compare People v. Crenshaw, 298 I11. 412, 131 N.E. 576 (1921) (death caused
by blow with bare fist does not constitute murder where victim and defendant are of com-
parable size and strength) with People v. Jones, 26 I11. 2d 381, 186 N.E.2d 246 (1962) (blow
with fist, causing a child to fall out of a moving automobile, sufficient to constitute murder)
and People v. Allum, 78 I11. App. 2d 462, 223 N.E.2d 187 (1st Dist. 1967) (repeated blows
to head with defendant's fists sufficient to justify murder conviction). See also People v. Mar-
row, 403 I11. 69, 85 N.E.2d 34 (1949) (unprovoked and unjustified blow to victim's head with
a wrench imposed a sufficient risk to justify a murder conviction); People v. Groh, 307 Ill.
165, 138 N.E. 523 (1923) (forcing victim, who was standing on the running board of defen-
dant's car, into another car imposed a sufficient risk to justify a murder conviction); People
v. Camberis, 297 I11. 455, 130 N.E. 712 (1921) (speeding imposed a sufficient risk to justify
a manslaughter conviction); People v. Venckus, 278 Ill. 124, 115 N.E. 880 (1917) (firing gun
into crowd of 20 people imposed a sufficient risk to justify a manslaughter conviction); Mur-
phy v. People, 37 Ill. 447 (1865) (struggle over a gun, during which victim was killed, imposed
a sufficient risk to justify a manslaughter conviction); People v. Gresham, 78 I11. App. 3d
1003, 398 N.E.2d 398 (3d Dist. 1979) (defendant's claim that he did not beat his daughter
but that he bumped her head against the wall while stumbling in an intoxicated state required
that the jury be given an instruction on involuntary manslaughter); People v. Johnson, 33 I11.
App. 3d 168, 337 N.E.2d 240 (4th Dist. 1975) (placing a pillow over victim's face creates a
strong probability of death and is sufficient to justify a murder conviction).
107. See, e.g., People v. Jordan, 18 I11. 2d 489, 165 N.E.2d 296 (1960) (stabbing deceased
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it in subsection (a)(2).'18 For reasons that are unexplained, however, the
drafting committee chose to describe it as knowing rather than reckless
murder, and it thereby created the problem heretofore described-that juries
cannot distinguish between intentional murder and murder in which the ac-
tor knew his conduct created a strong probability of death.
The alternative resolution of this problem, therefore, would be accom-
plished by reestablishing recklessness as the mental state required for murder
under subsection (a)(2). As proposed, the statute would read as follows:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits
murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(2) He acts recklessly under circumstances creating a strong probability
of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another ...
A careful examination of the definitions of knowledge and recklessness in
sections 4-51°9 and 4-61"° of the Criminal Code indicates that this formula-
tion does not, in legal effect, differ from the language currently used. Both
mental states require (1) a conscious awareness of a potential danger, and
(2) a voluntary act in disregard of the danger. The only real distinction exists
in the level of risk involved, with knowledge requiring that the result be
practically certain to occur, while recklessness involves only a substantial
risk. The substantive murder statute, however, both as currently formulated
and as herein proposed, substitutes its own risk level-that of strong
during a fight constitutes wanton and reckless disregard); People v. Wesley, 18 I11. 2d 138,
163 N.E.2d 500 (1959) (stabbing deceased in chest with screwdriver constitutes reckless disregard);
People v. Shields, 6 111. 2d 200, 127 N.E.2d 440 (1955) (reckless disregard sufficient for murder);
People v. Johnson, 2 111. 2d 165, 117 N.E.2d 91 (1954) (repeatedly shooting an unarmed victim
at an extremely close range is sufficient to sustain reckless and wanton murder conviction);
People v. Marrow, 403 111. 69, 85 N.E.2d 34 (1949) (striking deceased with a wrench demonstrates
reckless disregard, which is sufficient for murder conviction); People v. Simmons, 399 III. 572,
78 N.E.2d 269 (1948) (firing multiple shots at a victim who allegedly threatened defendant
with a knife constitutes reckless disregard, which is sufficient for murder conviction); Adams
v. People, 109 111. 444 (1884) (forcing victim to jump from train while train was in motion
constitutes reckless disregard, which is sufficient for murder conviction).
108. The Committee declared that "Section 9-1 is intended to define the types of conduct
which constitute murder, as indicated by the Illinois cases .. " ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 9-1 Committee Comments-1961 at 17 (Smith-Hurd 1979). Accordingly, in drafting the (a)(2)
unintentional murder provision, the Committee focused on the prevailing case law and con-
cluded that the "Illinois courts . . . use repeatedly expressions such as 'dangerous act likely
to produce death,' with reckless disregard of the consequences." Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
109. See supra note 69.
110. The definition of recklessness is as follows:
Recklessness. A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will
follow, described by the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes
a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exer-
cise in the situation. An act performed recklessly is performed wantonly, within
the meaning of a statute using the latter term, unless the statute clearly requires
another meaning.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-6 (1981).
TWO-MURDER RULE IN ILLINOIS
probability.I" Thus, under both formulations, murder exists if death is caused
by one who deliberately engages in dangerous conduct while subjectively
aware of a strong probability that death or great bodily harm will occur.
Notwithstanding the absence of a technical difference between the two for-
mulations, the proposed statute would have a significant practical effect,
because both knowledge and recklessness have a lay, as well as a legal, mean-
ing. A jury charged in the language of the proposed statute surely will not
conclude that one who shot his victim from point-blank range," 2 or stabbed
her several times in the chest," 3 acted "recklessly under circumstances creating
a strong probability of death."I" The very use of the word reckless in subsec-
tion (a)(2), particularly when juxtaposed against intent in subsection (a)(1),
delivers to a lay juror the message that he or she is being instructed to
distinguish between intentionally causing death and unintentionally causing
it through dangerous conduct.
The use of the mental state of recklessness to define unintentional murder
would not only return Illinois law to its status prior to the 1961 revision,
but would also render it consistent with the widely held modern views on
unintentional murder. Professors LaFave and Scott, for example, in defin-
ing this category of murder, which they call "depraved-heart" murder, speak
of "extremely negligent conduct."" ' 5 Similarly, Professors Perkins and Boyce
indicate that "an act may involve such a wanton and willful disregard of
an unreasonable human risk as to constitute malice aforethought even if
there is no actual intent to kill or injure.'" Finally, the Model Penal Code,
from which the mental states contained in Article 4 of the Illinois Criminal
Code of 1961 were adopted," 7 defines this category as murder "committed
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
111. See id. § 9-1(a)(2) (1981). The confusion engendered by the use of knowledge rather
than recklessness as the mental state for unintentional murder is illustrated by the decision
in People v. Guthrie, 123 11. App. 2d 407, 258 N.E.2d 802 (4th Dist. 1970). In that case,
the appellate court affirmed the jury's conclusion that the defendant had consciously engaged
in conduct that created a strong probability of death, but reversed the murder conviction because
his conduct was consistent with a mental state of recklessness. Id. at 411-14, 258 N.E.2d at
804-06. The court clearly was confused, by the statutory language, into believing that reckless
conduct could not support a murder conviction.
112. See People v. Henry, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1143, 432 N.E.2d 359 (3d Dist. 1982); People
v. Bone, 103 IIl. App. 3d 1066, 432 N.E.2d 329 (3d Dist. 1982); People v. Stocks, 93 Ill.
App. 3d 439, 417 N.E.2d 1080 (5th Dist. 1981).
113. See People v. Dunnigan, 89 Ill. App. 3d 763, 412 N.E.2d 37 (3d Dist. 1980).
114. See statute proposed herein.
115. Professors LaFave and Scott have written as follows:
Extremely negligent conduct, which creates what a reasonable man would realize
to be not only all unjustifiable but also a very high degree of risk of death or
serious bodily injury to another or to others-though unaccompanied by any intent
to kill or do serious bodily injury-and which actually causes the death of another,
may constitute murder.
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 541 (3d ed. 1972).
116. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 59 (3d ed. 1982).
117. Compare ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 4-4 to 4-7 (1981) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02
(2)(a)-(d) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962; Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
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of human life." ' Significantly, each of these formulations refers to the
Illinois decision in Mayes v. People"1 9 as an illustrative instance of the
category of murder being described.' 20 It is thus evident that the substitu-
tion of recklessness for knowledge as the required mental state for uninten-
tional murder under section 9-1(a)(2) would be consistent with established
Illinois law, would conform to widely accepted approaches to this category
of murder, and would sharply focus for the trier of fact the difference be-
tween intentional and unintentional murder.
CONCLUSION
In light of the constitutional requirement that the line between those
murders that have death penalty implications and those that. do not be clearly
and narrowly drawn, the decision by the Illinois legislature in 1977 to establish
intent to kill, or premeditation, as one factor for determining the location
of that line, has rendered it constitutionally necessary for Illinois juries to
make a specific determination on that issue.' 2 ' The existing evidence indicates,
however, that such a determination is rarely made, and, as a consequence,
the potential for arbitrariness condemned in Furman v. Georgia'22 and Moore
v. Illinois"3 has crept back into Illinois law.
The occasions on which a particular murder is declared to have been in-
tentional are rare, and it is considerably more frequent that what would
appear to have been an intentional murder is either not classified at all,
or is inadvertently misclassified as an unintentional murder. As a consequence,
actual culpability, as evidenced by intent, is only sometimes determined. The
correction of this situation, either through a carefully designed jury instruc-
tion or a change in the statutory language, to alert the jury to the need
for classification, is essential if the Illinois two-murder rule is to survive
constitutional scrutiny.
118. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(l)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
119. 106 I11. 306 (1883).
120. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., supra note 115, at 543 n.10; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 116, at 60 n.95; MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) comment a at 23 n.44 (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
121. The necessity that the jury distinguish between intentional and unintentional murder
would require a special verdict in murder trials, contrary to general Illinois practice. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4(1) (1981) ("Unless the affirmative defense of insanity has been presented
during the trial, the jury shall return a general verdict as to each offense charged."). This
requirement may be mandated, as well, by the significance of intent to kill raised in Enmund
v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982). See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text. The Illinois
legislature has recently adopted the use of special verdicts in which the jury is required to
make a finding of guilty but mentally ill. See Act of Sept. 17, 1981, Pub. Act No. 82-553,
§ 2, 1981 111. Laws 2782, 2786 (amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-40) (1981)).
122. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
123. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
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